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Unprecedented natures? An anatomy of the Chennai floods 
 
Abstract 
 
Between November and December 2015, the southern Indian city of Chennai 
(alongside the northern coastal regions in the state of Tamil Nadu) experienced 
torrential rains with unanticipated flood consequences. Notoriously known as 
India’s “water scarcity capital”, instead of the proverbial ‘poor monsoons’, a 
series of low-pressure depressions with ‘record-breaking’ rainfall submerged the 
city rapidly, as homes and apartments flooded, communications were cut, and 
transportation came to a standstill including the closure of the airport. Even as 
environmental activists took the state and its allied actors (in the development 
and planning sector) to task over what they considered was a deliberate and 
reckless ‘urbanisation of disaster’, the state sought refuge in the argument that 
this was an unprecedented (global) weather anomaly. Recognising the need for 
a more robust (post) disaster discussion, this paper offers an anatomy of the 
floods that begs a broader rethink of twenty-first century urban disasters and 
argues that the current discourse offered by the social science of disaster is 
insufficient in unravelling the complex spatial and environmental histories 
behind disasters. It goes beyond setting up a mere critique of capitalist 
urbanisation to offer a cogent debunking of the deeply engrained assumptions 
about the unprecedented nature of disasters. It does so by dismantling three 
commonly invoked arguments that transgress any kind of environmental 
common sense: 1. The 100-year flood fallacy, 2. The ensuing debates around 
environmental knowledges and subjectivities, and 3. The need to spatially 
rescale (and regionalise) the rationale of the ‘urbanisation of disaster’. It 
concludes by raising concerns over the persistence of a resilience discourse, one 
that relies on the will of the ‘expert’ underwriting not only a non-specific techno-
scientific approach but also perpetuates a politicisation of risk that shows little 
promise of accommodating new epistemologies that are socio-ecologically 
progressive.  
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‘There is no such thing as a natural disaster’ 
-  Neil Smith, 2005 
 
‘Chennai is a natural disaster of unprecedented scale’ 
- Prakash Javadekar, 2015  
Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Environment, Forests, 
and Climate Change, 26 May 2014 – 5 July 2016 
 
For a city tagged indubitably as India’s “water scarcity capital” (Potter 2015: 112), 
Chennai’s water woes took a surprising turn towards the end of 2015 when torrential rains 
pelted the city with unanticipated flood consequences. Only a month earlier, amidst 
nervous anticipation of the Northeast monsoon (or what is known popularly as the winter 
monsoon), newspapers were bemoaning a dismal Southwest or summer monsoon, by the 
end of which all sources of water supply had been sucked dry, and politicians and 
policymakers were running out of their repertoire of tricks to avoid a drought-ridden 
disaster.  While the initial onset of rains brought some comfort to an anxious city, it soon 
became obvious that this was not going to be yet another year of average or less than 
normal rainfall. Instead, through a series of low-pressure depressions in the Bay of Bengal 
triggered by what weather experts referred to as a ‘super-charged monsoon’, Chennai (and 
the northern coastal regions in the state of Tamil Nadu) experienced heavy downpour 
resulting in ‘record-breaking’ rainfall for the months of November and December. As the 
city submerged rapidly, homes and apartments were flooded, communications were cut, 
and transportation came to a standstill, including the closure of the airport for several days. 
With lives lost, extensive property damage and businesses affected, Chennai was declared 
officially a disaster.  
 
Almost immediately, Katrina-esque images of a ‘city under water’ circulated widely 
over the Internet and international media relayed reports on this deadly disaster. Even the 
UK broadsheet The Guardian set aside its frequent preoccupation with Mumbai as India’s 
metonymic megacity to cover this critical situation. As a city that rarely makes it on the 
international radar of news reporting, after the devastating 2004 tsunami, Chennai found its 
natural misery being written once again into a global story. Somewhat reassuring during 
this dark hour was the spate of citizen reporting where residents provided eyewitness 
accounts of the unfolding events in terms of not only a sense of shock over losses incurred 
but also with empathy about how they were recouped through the voluntary heroics of 
ARABINDOO: CHENNAI FLOODS 
 
 
CITY JOURNAL 3 31/01/2017 
local civilians. Since the Mumbai floods of 2005, such framings have become a standard 
where, as Anjaria (2006) observed, public imagination is captured by incredible acts of 
selflessness and outpourings of generosity, with people setting aside their socio-economic 
prejudices to help one another and ensure that the city doesn’t descend into outright chaos. 
Often relayed through popular coverage by traditional and, more recently, social media, 
they claim not only a realistic representation of the lived experience of disaster but their 
optimistic ethos is also a much-needed morale booster at a moment of despair.1 While 
these stories may not shy away from asking difficult questions such as the need to untangle 
longstanding socio-political factors that contributed to the disaster, such queries are 
implicit as their preoccupation is to lessen the sense of threat for those caught in the milieu 
of the aftermath, unwittingly making the event seem more personal and constrained. It 
would be too much to expect these free-floating narratives to assemble the parts and pieces 
of this particular event together into a broader (post)-disaster appraisal. More importantly, 
in a context where those affected are eager to know ‘why this has happened (to us)’, 
individual, first-hand, folkloric accounts provide little challenge to the explanations offered 
by a State quick to acquit itself.  
 
Thus, while the Chief Minister Jayalalithaa’s initial reaction that ‘losses are 
unavoidable when there’s very heavy rain’ suggests a commonly entrenched fatalism about 
the monsoons and its regular trail of death and destruction, her subsequent depiction of the 
event as the ‘rarest of the rare’ is more in line with the official position projecting the 
floods as unprecedented. This is not dissimilar to Davis’ (1995) dialectic of ordinary 
disaster where, by berating the weather for its perversity, the state covers its lapse in 
foreseeing the catastrophe or mitigating its effect, presenting them instead as historically 
specific episodes embedded within a specious claim of exceptionalism. While there is a 
planetary appeal to Davis’ argument, there is an imperative to postcolonialise it as 
otherwise we risk obscuring specific socio-political causes that trigger what is increasingly 
broadbrushed as a global weather anomaly, and ignoring (neo)colonial practices producing 
specific forms of vulnerability. It is in this effort that this paper begins by taking up issue 
with the emphasis on the ‘unprecedented’, as it favours an environmental determinism that 
undermines a critical disaster discourse. As Paul Brass (1986) showed through his analysis 
                                                 
1 #Chennairainshelp and @ChennaiRainsOrg were amongst the prominent ones who provided an information 
platform to help Chennaiites during the floods.  
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of the Bihar Famine of 1966-67, the notion of the unprecedented is a political invention 
that has no standing in the definitions of social science.  It masks the fact that the crisis 
situation is generally less of a deviation from the normal, often falling in place within a 
classic sequence of recurring flood and drought. At the same time, there needs to be some 
sensitivity in challenging this perception as we try and explain this scepticism to those 
affected, whose personal sense of calamity is unforeseen.  
 
Additionally, in the case of Chennai, against accusations by environmental activists 
that urban development practices and their lack of respectful mutuality in the human-
environment interaction were to blame for the disaster, both the regional and the national 
State were keen on retelling the disaster as a global weather anomaly. Thus, in light of the 
COP21 meeting held in Paris a few days after the catastrophic December floods, Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi blamed climate change for the ‘unseasonal rains’. Indian media 
and environmental agencies picked up observations from the American space agency 
NASA and UNESCAP that the record precipitation was unusual, amplified by record-
warm seas and the long-distance effects of El Niño. There were even suggestions that the 
tropical depression that brought heavy rains to the city was the remnant of Typhoon 
Marilyn, or In-fa which had formed near the Philippines, cutting a wide berth across not 
just Chennai, but India’s east coast and even northern parts of Sri Lanka. Thus, deliberate 
efforts were made to assimilate the floods into a continuum of calamities cascading across 
the world with a supposedly planetary connection.2  
 
Such interpretations are steeped in a liberal discourse of political denial, where the 
argument of weather disturbance and upheaval is invoked by the state not just to dispel 
citizen anxieties but, as shown by the media studies scholar Sturken (2001) in her 
impressive analysis of the 1997-98 El Niño, this is also a form of narrative that precludes 
political analysis or action. Through rhetorical manoeuvres, a state rubric is developed 
                                                 
2 The comment about ‘unseasonal rains’ shows the lack of geometeorological knowledge amongst India’s leaders who 
generally assume that the entire country is served by the Southwest or summer monsoons (June-September). Tamil 
Nadu is part of the minor group of southeastern states in India who receive almost 50 percent of their annual rainfall 
from the Northwest or winter monsoons (October-December). Regarding the construction of the event as a global 
weather anomaly, see Bell, C. (2015, 18 November). Rain storms from Chennai to Colorado. The Guardian. Retrieved 
from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/nov/18/weatherwatch-chennai-india-rain-evcuation-sri-lanka-south-
africa-us [Accessed on 24.02.2016] 
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around the supposed authority of science to disable more discerning discussions of 
disaster. Civil society groups in the city are well aware of this tactic, one that hardly 
advances our scientific understanding of local environmental hazards. Frustrated with a 
State that wilfully ignores their ecological standpoint that disasters are compounded by the 
unsustainable dynamics of contemporary urbanisation, activists, over the past few months, 
have taken to public platforms, demanding accountability for what is essentially a State 
propelled urbanisation of disaster.3  And yet, the State continues to snub them, focusing 
instead on populist measures such as cash and material compensation. This is tied to the 
patronage politics as fine-tuned to differing degrees by the two Dravidian regional parties 
who have been in power in Tamil Nadu since 1967 (DMK and ADMK), and who use 
significant moments such as the floods to offer material appeals (Wyatt 2013). In a crucial 
election year (May 2016), the Tamil Nadu State Government is only too aware of the 
challenge that severe weather events pose to incumbent politicians, as a result of which 
official post-disaster steps are dictated by electoral interests.4  
 
Writing in the aftermath of Katrina, Neil Smith (2006) stressed the importance of 
putting social science to work as a counterweight against official attempts dismissing 
Katrina as an inevitable “natural” disaster. For, it is thanks to the persistence of critical 
social theorists that we now have the uncontested axiom in disaster studies: “there is no 
such thing as a natural disaster”.5 While a wide-ranging literature comprising ‘the social 
science of disaster’ has contributed to a better understanding of how individuals and 
institutions respond under catastrophic circumstances, they have unwittingly set off a new 
sense of unease. Mostly, this has to do with their overwhelming reliance on lexicons such 
as risk, resilience, vulnerability and mitigation, constructs that have been co-opted by 
policymakers for their own gain, and matter less to those affected. It is also that there is 
something to the ‘nature’ of twenty-first century urban disasters that begs a rethink, one 
                                                 
3 Nithyanand Jayaraman is one environmental activist who has berated the state and its allied capitalist 
interests (including mega-infrastructure projects) for incapacitating the city against the onslaught of 
monsoons. See his post that appeared in http://scroll.in/article/769928/chennai-floods-are-not-a-natural-
disaster-theyve-been-created-by-unrestrained-construction. [Accessed on 24.02.2016] 
4 The combination of largely material-based clientalism and patronage politics with programmatic policies is 
characteristic of the Dravidian parties that have ruled Tamil Nadu since 1967. See Wyatt (2013) for a more 
detailed discussion of the differentiating nuances. In the May 2016 Assembly elections to the State of Tamil 
Nadu, the ruling party ADMK managed to retain power but suffered electoral losses in 10 out of 16 Chennai 
constituencies, attributed by many to their poor ground action during the floods.   
5 When Neil Smith (2006) wrote that there is no such thing as a natural disaster, he was picking up on 
common adage that hazards are natural while disasters are man-made.   
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that draws from not a fixed position but a series of positionings where, simply tagging 
disasters as social is not enough, insufficient as it is to unravel the complex spatial and 
environmental histories behind disasters. It is in pursuit of a better theoretical framework 
for such a task that Gotham and Greenberg (2014) suggest forging a link between the 
currently separate scholarship of disaster studies and urban studies, two fields that rarely 
converse with each other. Their reasoning is not only to connect disaster events to the 
broader contexts of urbanisation and social change, but to address specifically how social 
forces that produce systemic risk and vulnerability are themselves embedded within a 
longer genealogy of capitalist urbanisation. In challenging the discursive rationale of an 
unprecedented weather anomaly as presented in the aftermath of the Chennai floods, this 
paper follows their suggestion, undertaking a more cogent debunking of the deeply 
engrained prejudices about disasters, identifying especially the contradictions nested 
within their reference to a landscape of risk and resilience. In particular, the focus is to 
demystify and dismantle three commonly invoked arguments that sought to transgress 
attempts at any kind of environmental common sense: 1. The 100-year fallacy, 2. The 
ensuing debates around environmental knowledges and subjectivities, and 3. The need to 
spatially rescale (and regionalise) our understanding of ‘urbanisation of disaster’.  
 
The 100-year flood fallacy 
In the days immediately following the November and December rains, there was a burst of 
interest in all things related to meteorology, as it became for some key actors (i.e. 
politicians, policymakers and the media) the scapegoat lens for explaining the crisis. For 
instance, satellite map based animations by the US space agency NASA highlighting the 
unprecedented nature of the rainfall were circulated eagerly in an attempt to naturalise the 
‘extreme weather event’ narrative. NASA’s effective imagery showed an unusually high 
intensity of rainfall from 28 November to 04 December, with a special emphasis that 
‘Chennai, between 1 and 2 December received more rainfall in 24 hours than it had seen 
on any day since 1901’.6 This was picked up by the local media as alert flash headlines: 
‘Chennai weather forecast by NASA: Chennai rain broke 100 year old record, says US 
                                                 
6 Historic Rainfall Floods Southeast India (2015, 09 December). Retrieved from 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=87131&src=eorss-
iotd&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter [Accessed on 24.02.2016] 
ARABINDOO: CHENNAI FLOODS 
 
 
CITY JOURNAL 7 31/01/2017 
space agency’.7 Amidst an on-ground struggle to make sense of the deluge and its 
aftermath, the 100-year flood rationale emerged as a master narrative whose apocalyptic 
recital provided, if not an explanation, at least some kind of framing to an event that was 
supposedly uncontrollable, arbitrary and chaotic. Over the next few months as it was 
bandied about in policy, media and public discussions with no questions about its scientific 
rigour, it conveniently served as a smokescreen to avoid the more uncomfortable task of 
unraveling the complex anatomy of the disaster.  
 
The 100-year flood is a rough schematic that emerged in the 1970s as western 
governments tried to calibrate flood frequency in a statistical manner compatible with the 
rise of the flood insurance industry. Its relativism notwithstanding (supposedly to allow a 
level comparison of areas of risk), its reckless public invocation has resulted in it becoming 
a highly compromised and misunderstood factual information. While even Wikipedia will 
tell you that the term ‘100-year flood’ does not refer to a flood that occurs once every 100 
years, this is precisely what a layperson assumes with none bothering to rectify this 
misreading. Given their immediate experience with the devastation caused by the floods, 
the public is comforted by the 100-year flood argument as they set the possibility of the 
disaster happening again at a safe temporal distance, hundred years into the remote future. 
It is this blending of science with sentiment that fails to clarify its real meaning: what it 
indicates is a one percent chance of flooding in any given year. As Pielke (1999) 
explained, in terms of cumulative probability there is a greater than 26 per cent chance that 
we will see at least one 100-year flood over a period of 30 years (and, similarly, more than 
a 74 percent chance over 100 years). There is as well the fundamental question over its 
credibility as an explanatory science. In what is essentially seen as a ‘statistical 
abstraction’ (Davis 1995: 230) manipulating an idealised parameter (ignoring the diversity 
and complexity of floods as a real phenomenon and forcing a selective extraction of data or 
facts), Baker (1994: 145) dismisses the 100-year flood as a doubly fallacious term: 
These words, of course, have essentially nothing to do with real years or with real 
floods. Instead, the words represent an idealization based on (often fallacious) 
assumptions. They are an example, not of science, but of an insidious form of 
philosophical nominalism…it is a particularly weak form of reasoning, induction, which 
generalizes from specific cases.  
                                                 
7The Financial Express (2015, 12 December). Retrieved from 
http://www.financialexpress.com/photos/business-gallery/177148/chennai-weather-forecast-by-nasa-chennai-
rain-broke-100-year-old-record-on-december-1-and-2/5/ [Accessed on 24.02.2016] 
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As an applied science, its serviceable logic is questionable as it is based on past flood 
records and is thus subject to considerable errors when it comes to forecasting the 
exigencies of nature. The greater risk is the consequence of planning decisions that 
incorporate the 100-year flood framing into its policy, with assumptions based on a static 
model of nature. Failing to recognise that the 100-year flood is, in reality, dynamic and 
needs to be redefined with every new flood event leads to dead-on-arrival regulatory 
standards that barely withstand the next sequence of floods and needs to be constantly 
revised. This is precisely why Davis (1995) passionately argues that the 100-year flood is 
based not only on a fictional ecological history, but also on mechanistic periodicities which 
does not accommodate the complexity of a natural drainage pattern that is evolving and 
shifting with every successive flood.  
 
There is a bigger problem with the 100-year flood mode of historical referencing 
which is that it uses rainfall data to emphasise the ‘record’ more than anything else. 
Compounded as we are by the brevity of our hydrological documentation, there is hardly 
any supporting information to be gleaned from precipitation registers which simply reveal 
the amount of rainfall received in a given day, month or year. Prone to numerical 
sensationalism, we allow a discourse at the lowest common denominator to flourish. What 
does the Meteorological department seek to convey when it reels out its numbers: ‘Chennai 
had 246.5mm rainfall in the last 24 hours which breaks the record of November 2005 
which saw 142.4mm….the highest rainfall during the north-east monsoon was in 
November 1976, when the city recorded a rainfall of 452.4mm’.8 While such foreboding 
declarations are meant to exaggerate the paranoia of a big weather story, it is drawn from a 
sketchy analytical terrain precluding a more sophisticated understanding of the event. 
Disadvantaged as we are by this blunt empiricism, Davis (1995) rails against the imaginary 
norms and averages that are constantly invoked as standards. Merely an abstraction, 
nothing is less likely to occur than average rainfall. As he astutely points out, the chance of 
the annual precipitation hitting the average mark is probably only a few times in the history 
of measured rainfall. The actual norm is an oscillation between dry and humid periods. 
Sometimes, the annual average is delivered during the course of a month and couple of 
                                                 
8 The Indian Express (2015, 17 November). Retrieved from http://indianexpress.com/photos/picture-gallery-
others/chennai-receives-heaviest-rainfall-in-a-decade-city-plunged-in-despair/2/ [Accessed on 24.02.2016] 
ARABINDOO: CHENNAI FLOODS 
 
 
CITY JOURNAL 9 31/01/2017 
storms. At other times, it may take two or even three drought years to achieve the same 
total.  
 
If we are to persist with a statistical investigation of weather as an omnipresent 
discursive trope, the big question is why we fail to draw a meaningful pattern from the de 
facto numbers, treating each instance exceeding the ‘average’ as unique. This is partially 
because even though we have a precipitation log since the beginning of the twentieth-
century, our historical knowledge of floods relies on a less scientific form of repository 
involving archives and oral histories. Anecdotal recollections from a few sources mention 
episodes of flooding in 1903, 1918, 1943, 1969, 1976, 1985, 1996, 1998, and 2005. There 
are specific accounts in addition about concentrated flooding in parts of Chennai in 2002, 
2004, and 2010. Figure 1 provides Chennai’s precipitation summary since 1901 (the years 
with acknowledged flooding area highlighted in dark grey while the ones in light grey 
show comparable rainfall but no record of floods). Bearing in mind that while excessive 
rainfall often leads to flooding, it is not something that is immanent in nature. Looking at 
the numbers forces a few ‘thinking out aloud’ questions: 1. 1903 was one of the earliest 
recorded flood event in the city’s history when it received nearly 2000mm of annual 
rainfall, with an unusually high amount in December (466.35mm was the highest till 2015 
surpassed this figure with 539mm). Even though we have little information about the 
geography of flooding in these two different epochs and there are several unaccounted for 
variables, purely on a numerical basis, one cannot help question a century’s worth of 
modernisation and development if the city remains susceptible to the same amount of 
rainfall as it was hundred years ago. 2. If these numbers hint at some possibility of a 
speculative analysis, then one obvious indication is of a recurring frequency of floods with 
similar patterns of excessive rainfall, at a closer range than the mythical 100 years. A 
recent report Why Urban India Floods (2016) by the Delhi-based Centre for Science and 
Environment (CSE) mentions at least 7 major flood events in Chennai since 2000. Also 
acknowledged by many is the fact that what Chennai experienced in 2015 is not very 
different from the rainfall pattern of 2005, with clearly tenable links and potential lessons 
to be learnt. In persistently viewing each flood year as a tightly circumscribed statistical 
artifact refusing parallels with previous episodes, we are left with a weakly constituted 
knowledge that precludes a more insightful analysis. This is further compounded by an 
almost non-existent critical scholarship of the milestone 2005 floods, especially from the 
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social science of disaster perspective. If we are to draw a critical analysis that is more than 
a speculation, we need to approach this historic data as an analytic, not simply a 
mathematical register.  But in our eagerness to sustain the pretense of exceptionalism, we 
ignore the precedents staring at us in the eye stripping them of their analytically pliable 
referential meanings. Harsh though it might seem to those affected, the month long torment 
that the inhabitants suffered was little different from the classic pattern (except perhaps in 
the unusual intensity of rainfall), compelling us to reconsider the allure of explanations 
such as the 100-year flood. If any concessions are to be made as to the extraordinary nature 
of the floods, then it is in regarding them as the ‘worst’, reflecting an unparalleled 
exposure rather than an unprecedented phenomenon. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Caption: Chennai’s rainfall data from 1901-2015 
Source: Compiled from several sources including Indian Meteorological Department 
and India Water Portal (retrieved from http://www.indiawaterportal.org/met_data/) 
[Accessed on 24.02.2016] 
 
Environmental knowledges and subjectivities 
In the wake of the December floods, the national television channel NDTV ran a coverage 
declaring ‘In Chennai Floods, Middle Class Among The Hardest Hit’.9 In this reportage, 
the channel profiled a typical middle-class family in the southern suburb of Mudichur 
(touted by many as ‘one of the worst affected areas in the city’) who had to abandon their 
home during the floods and returned to find all their belongings (they referred mostly to 
their consumer goods, i.e. television, washing machine, refrigerator etc.) damaged beyond 
repair. Used in the wake of any calamity to the role of gracious do-gooders, the middle 
class found it difficult to reconcile themselves to occupying the same precarious position 
of the poor as the ‘badly affected’. Resenting being forced into a hat in hand position, the 
middle-class couple in this particular programme lashed out against the state as they 
scoffed at the paltry governmental offer of cash and material compensation (Rs. 10,000 to 
those who lost their homes and Rs. 5,000 for those whose homes were damaged plus ten 
                                                 
9 NDTV (2015, 12 December). In Chennai Floods, Middle Class Among The Hardest Hit. Retrieved from 
http://www.ndtv.com/chennai-news/in-chennai-floods-middle-class-among-the-hardest-hit-1253988 
[Accessed on 24.02.2016] 
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kilograms of rice and clothing in the form of one free dhoti and saree). As one disgruntled 
resident said, the Rs. 5,000 offered would only be adequate to get someone to clean their 
premises.  
 
While it is probably an exaggeration to say that the middle class were the worst 
affected, there is partial truth to the argument that the floods this time wrecked as much 
havoc on middle class neighbourhoods as they did on the poorer areas of the city. 
However, as activist Kela (2015) clarified in his online post, there are differential impacts 
wherein slums and shantytowns along the river are swept away almost instantly while 
middle-class localities suffer only considerable inconvenience. The woeful reality is the 
historic production of uneven flood risk areas where disasters remain a province of the 
poor living as they do in unstable structures on flood plains, and whose subsistence living 
is more severely disrupted by a recurring cycle of drought and excessive rains. Thus, as 
Smith (2006, n.p.) argued in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, natural disasters are in 
essence a social disaster as they ‘simply don’t flatten landscapes…they deepen and erode 
the ruts of social difference they encounter’. What is interesting in the specific case of 
Chennai is the way the ‘naturalisation’ of social contradictions (cf. Davis 1998) was 
framed by the two largely affected social groups, the middle class and the poor. Looking at 
the two in parallel helps us understand better how, in moments of crisis as this, one thinks 
and acts about the environment as a relevant referential category, not only at a given point 
of time (especially in a post-floods scenario) but also in terms of changes over time.  
 
In this context, the aftermath of the Chennai floods presents an apt moment to 
reconsider the continuously shifting nature of environmental knowledges and 
subjectivities, especially its (re)production through social relations and institutions. Based 
on his research in the Himalayan district of Kumaon, Agrawal (2005) employed Luke’s 
(1995) Foucauldian notion of environmentality to identify ‘environmental subjects’ as a 
category of people for whom the environment as a conceptual domain organises their 
thinking and in conscious relation to how they perform some of their actions. At the same 
time, he found that while the environment might have deep ramifications for people’s 
social identity and well-being, their everyday practices and knowledges might not be 
always shaped by the environment. Pertinent to the debate here is the fact that such 
subjectivities are constantly made and unmade where, despite a complex knowledge 
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production process, certain forms of knowledge are validated over others. Moreover, while 
environmental subjectivities are socio-historically constituted, particular conjunctures such 
as the floods have a major transformative potential, not only offering a critical space for 
the production of new subjectivities but also providing a terrain within which to foster new 
socioenvironmental practices. This forces us to rethink the material geographies of 
vulnerability and the practical decisions that are ill-informed by a rather superficial 
understanding of the crisis, especially in terms of how people perceive their own exposure 
to disaster and what bearing it might have on the larger flood narrative. Focussing on the 
meanings that the middle class and the poor draw out of their environmental knowledges 
and subjectivities thus provides for interesting revelations. In the aftermath of the floods, 
an immediate reaction of most of the affected middle-class residents who found themselves 
evacuating their homes overnight was surprise and shock that their ‘brand new’ residential 
developments were in areas vulnerable to the floods.  
 
Over the last decade or two, the southern part of the city has been subject to a rush of 
urbanisation and development resulting in a massive overhaul of its geography and its 
natural features. Chennai based ecologist, Jayshree Vencatesan (2007: 288) rues this 
forgotten fact:  
A large part of south Chennai was historically a flood plain as evidenced by the soil 
type of the region…Spread over 50 sq. km, it comprised of a large marsh (Pallikaranai 
marsh), smaller satellite wetlands and large tracts of pasture land. Locally known as 
Kaiveli (a generic Tamil name for marshes and swamps), the Pallikaranai marsh drained 
about 250 sq. km. The numerous smaller wetlands that surrounded the marsh served as 
the only source of irrigation for the area, which thrived on paddy cultivation. This gave 
the marsh a legendary status since the villages did not have wells or dug-out ponds, 
which are the norm in the northern districts of Tamil Nadu.  
 
As a natural resource, it thus was essential during precolonial times that much of this tract 
remain undeveloped. But during the colonial era, a revenue-based land settlement and 
administration meant that wetlands were falsely identified firstly as uncultivated land and 
eventually as wastelands within a State classification of land uses (Vencatesan 2006). This 
continued into the postcolonial years as a result of which their ecological significance has 
been largely forgotten and making it easy to transform their use value for speculative 
developmental purposes. Abused by the State and citizens equally, the marsh came to be 
used not only as a waste disposal site by the Corporation of Chennai but has also been 
actively encroached upon for residential and commercial development projects. Over the 
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decades, Pallikaranai marsh has become a key symbol of the environmental degradation of 
the southern part of Chennai with large-scale infrastructure projects propelling the worst 
kind of capitalist urbanisation model that completely disregards its natural eco-system. To 
paraphrase Ranganathan (2015), the very physicality of the wetlands (and its 
indeterminacy of ownership) suggests a “consequential materiality” that is ideal for 
millennial capital’s “becoming-being”.  It is no wonder that by the beginning of the 
twenty-first century only 10 per cent of the marsh remained (600 ha).  
 
Initially, there was little recognition of the significance of this loss, as the colonial 
administration had replaced its associated eri (tank or reservoir) system of rainwater 
catchments and spill-overs with an engineered storm water drainage system. The former is 
more suited to the city’s flat topography, designed as they were to capture slow and 
gradual movement of water across the landscape through a series of interconnected bunds, 
but was overlaid with a storm water drainage network whose reliance on gravity in a city 
with very slight gradient made it difficult to capture flowing water, resulting in stagnant 
water pools (Jameson and Baud 2016). To this date, state governments prefer the latter 
despite the fact that eris historically served the dual purpose of groundwater recharge and 
flood management efficiently. As their function was displaced by storm water drains, they 
have rapidly decreased in numbers amidst a lack of initiative from the State towards their 
conservation: Chennai had more than 600 waterbodies in the 1980s with only a fraction 
remaining today (27 according to a report by the National Institute of Disaster 
Management). And the area of 19 major lakes has shrunk from 1130 ha in the 1980s to 
around 645 ha in the early 2000s.  However, the modern engineering infrastructure of 
storm water drains has been inadequate as well in compensating for the loss of this natural 
system. Thus, with only 855 km of storm water drains against 2,847 km of urban roads, 
even a marginally heavy rainfall causes havoc in the city (DownToEarth Publication 
2016).10 
 
Ironically, it was the floods of 2002 that brought some awareness to the issue at hand 
when inundation of residential areas along the marshes combined with health concerns 
                                                 
10 This figure is contradicted by the Corporation of Chennai which claims that it maintains a Storm Water 
Drain network of 1660.31 km within the city against 6000 km of roads. Whatever the number, it shows that 
less than 30 per cent of the city’s roads is lined with the necessary service infrastructure.  
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around the burning of the garbage dumped on site rallied residents together with 
environmental activists in the city to petition the government for remedial and mitigating 
measures. Eventually, in 2007, 317 ha of the marsh was declared a Reserve Forest. While 
civil society groups actively involved in this debate view this as a victory of sorts, the 2015 
floods showed that such tokenistic gestures are insufficient as the marsh’s incapacitation as 
a natural flood sink proved to be a major reason for flooding in the southern areas of the 
city. Even though Pallikaranai marsh captured public imagination as a prominent 
environmental debate in the first decade of the twenty-first century, dominating often the 
media headlines, most of Chennai’s residents remain unaware of such ecological framings, 
focussing on specific aspects such as the burning of the garbage rather than the larger 
concern of flood plain destruction. Such a position confirms Agrawal’s (2005) argument 
that environmental subjectivity reflects one’s own knowledge and preference often based 
on compulsion or short-term interest, and also cautions against the limited possibility of 
these actions morphing into larger ideological beliefs about the environment. It is thus not 
surprising when many affected middle-class residents showed little geographical 
awareness about the ecological destruction wrought by the residential developments they 
had bought into. Thus, in Lessons from Chennai floods profiled by The Hindu Business 
Line, middle class residents complained as to how they bought into the promise of ‘lake 
view’ apartments, little realising that they were built on a lake: 
I bought that apartment only in June. They said it’s a lake view apartment, but the entire 
place looks like a lake now.11 
 
Many according to this report were unaware that their residential areas were either built on 
a lake or a wetland as they claimed they weren’t aware of the history of the place. This is 
unfortunate as something simple such as paying attention to the etymology of place names 
would have told them more than enough. Thus, most neighbourhood names in southern 
Chennai finish with either ‘akkam’ or ‘eri’, with the former referring in Tamil to a location 
along a waterbody while the later refers to a tank or reservoir. In the above story, residents 
interviewed were mostly from Perumbakkam, again ‘one of the worst affected areas’, its 
misery coming from a little acknowledged and long-forgotten geographical reality.  
 
                                                 
11 Nirmal, Rajalakshmi (2015, 13 December). Lessons from Chennai floods: Why home buyers should know 
geography. The Hindu Business Line. Retrieved from 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/portfolio/people/lessons-from-chennai-floods-why-home-buyers-
should-know-geography/article7983497.ece [Accessed 24.02.2016] 
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It isn’t that the middle-class residents were not aware of their neighbourhood being 
in a ‘low-lying area’, used as they often are to rainwater stagnation of one foot or so during 
the monsoon period. What they didn’t anticipate is the little it took for these low-lying 
neighbourhoods to quickly sink into flood-prone areas.  As the floods emerged as a 
calamity that the middle class no longer witnessed at a safe distance but one they had to 
live through, it became clear that the environmental subjectivity of the middle class was 
not built on ecological awareness, rather their emphasis was on the fact that they were 
ignorant of any such knowledge. This aspect of not knowing is something anthropologists 
such as Dilley (2010) have highlighted as critical to investigations of knowledge. The 
emphasis is on knowledge and ignorance as being mutually constitutive, not simply as an 
opposition where one is seen as the negation of the other, but more importantly in terms of 
how a dialectic between knowledge and ignorance is played out in specific sets of social 
and political relations. In the context of Chennai’s middle class, their claim of lack of 
knowledge cannot be seen as plain ignorance but a wilful act of refusing to take notice of 
the environment, especially when they are capable of knowing, and perhaps might even be 
expected to have some sort of social obligation to know. In a similar vein, Mair, Kelly and 
High (2012) show that ignorance is not so much the lack of knowledge but one that 
incorporates certain knowledge, logics, ethics, emotions, and social relationships. 
Following this argument, it becomes clear that the middle class, by professing to not know 
the rules, the ecology of the soil, vulnerability of the land, etc. have become complicit in a 
certain kind of speculative urbanism to thrive, one that is dependent on practices that are 
the result of not knowing. Convinced that such knowledge was not essential, their 
ignorance reinforces a form of knowledge in its own right, acquiring a cognitive content 
and false consciousness, one that is used to justify their (lack of) environmental 
subjectivity. What renders this knowing/not knowing dialectic even more incongruous is 
the fact that most members of the middle class have found their economic prosperity 
through employment opportunities in a knowledge economy the success of which thrives 
on an ignorance economy nurtured by State and capital interests. Here, the middle class 
emphasise their deniability by not only avoiding knowledge but a few also insisted that it is 
up to the experts to produce information about risk, valorising a bourgeois mode of 
knowledge production and allowing environmental knowledge to be twisted by political 
spin. The State playing on middle-class confusions regarding environmental risks and 
uncertainties is not only able to contort the “hard facts” of environmental degradation but 
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also convince them to doubt civil society arguments as an exaggeration. ‘It cannot be that 
bad’ is what middle-class residents resort to as a response when reminded about the extent 
of environmental damage to the city’s natural features. This is not surprising given 
Mawdsley’s (2009) already established scepticism about the environmental subjectivity of 
India’s urban middle classes. Whatever exists, she argued, carries little traction, signifying 
an ecologically-deficient environmentalism, one that is regressive and authoritarian.  
 
On the other hand, the poor address their vulnerability of living on risky terrain not 
through deliberate unknowing but a carefully developed system of knowing, one that does 
not subscribe to the usual domains of knowledge systems and reinforces the limitations of 
following any kind of local/indigenous/traditional vs western/modern/scientific binary. 
Their perception of an environmentally unsafe situation is premised not on a scientific 
knowledge but a simpler understanding of clear and present danger based on their need for 
surviving the annual cycle of floods. Drawing from their ethnographic research of risk 
perception in an Argentinian shantytown, Auyero and Swistun (2008: 369) introduce the 
notion of ‘relational anchoring’, that is, the ‘cognitive heuristics people use to select and 
digest information about their environment—and thus their perception of hazards—are 
relationally anchored in everyday routines’. Driven by the necessity of knowing their 
hazardous environment, the poor develop a system of noesis to make sense of the 
inevitability of hazards and the continued disruption of their everyday lives. This is 
attached to a wider understanding of a risky environment which includes unsanitary living 
conditions, polluted drinking water and a myriad set of health-related hazards. In this 
context, floods are one of many risks that needs to be balanced and overcome through a 
carefully constructed set of strategies against multiple others occurring often at the same 
time. As a result of this continuous exposure, what they tend to do is normalise the risk, 
not by ignoring it, but by cognitively and materially adapting to it, so that the perceived 
risk is at least lowered over time (Sara, Jameson, Pfeffer and Baud 2016). It is not that they 
have become accustomed to the recurring floods, but employ ‘diverse knowledge that 
structures the course of mundane life, ranging from unconscious routines and pragmatic, 
problem-oriented knowledge to the general socio-cultural framework and its normative 
instructions for social action’ (Ehlert 2012: 18).  
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Following the 2005 floods and the subsequent announcement by the government in 
2009 of a Cooum River Restoration Project, several slum dwellers living along the banks 
of the Cooum River, including those in the Pudupet area were evicted and relocated to 
slum resettlement sites in Semmancheri and Kannagi Nagar, 30-40 kms south of the city. 
Disregarding the fact that the latter are part of the now forgotten wetland system, the 
resettlement exposed the evicted slum-dwellers to new kinds of vulnerability. Speaking 
about their experiences of resettlement, one of them explained clearly their positionality 
vis a vis vulnerability and risk: 
Yes, we lived in slums and yes, we lived in river banks. And yes, there were floods 
often, almost annually, some worse and some not so bad. But we coped with it. Our 
shelter was constructed with temporary materials (kuccha), and at the first sight of 
floods we would pick up our belongings and run to higher ground for shelter. 
Sometimes, we would have relocated all our things elsewhere in anticipation of the 
floods. At other times, you should see us running for our lives with our belongings on 
our head. Yes, we suffered when our houses were washed away and we had to rebuild 
them again. Initially, we agreed to move here thinking this was a better option. But 
there, everything else was intact: jobs, schools for our children, clinics, everything was 
nearby and we could access them all. But by relocating us here, this is permanent 
disaster. There are no jobs, no schools, no hospitals. Nothing. You think this 
[resettlement site] is not flood-prone. You put us in a swamp. You should see this place 
when the rains come. It is worse than what we faced along the river banks. We have to 
wade our way through at least a couple of feet of water and there are all these snakes 
and other animals whose habitats we have displaced and who are now a constant threat 
to us.   
 
Even though they had no grand flood management strategy in place, using tacit knowledge 
or what Boyer (2008) refers to as “para-ethnographic” knowledge and adaptive solutions, 
the poor developed a lifestyle of ‘living with floods’, one that involved the interweaving of 
a crude form of meteorological knowledge with their quotidian routine (here we need to 
resist any tendency to romanticise an indigenous knowledge system based on a perfect but 
non-existent man/environment relationship). That their vulnerability has been exasperated 
through these resettlement projects became evident in the 2015 rains when Semmancheri 
flooded rapidly, cutting off the resettlement sites from disaster assistance.12 Doshi (2013: 
226) in the context of Mumbai’s resettlement politics discusses how slum dwellers 
advance new forms of environmental politics through a subjectivity that is ‘produced 
through the intersecting experiences and politics of redevelopment, displacement, and 
ecology’. However, it is hard to share her optimism that ‘the spatial and relational 
                                                 
12 Again, the lack of etymological knowledge regarding place names is clear as one needs to only look at the 
suffix eri in Semmancheri to understand its original role as a reservoir.  
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production of environmental subjectivity among evicted slum-dwellers is key to urban 
spatial transformation and possibilities for social justice’ (p. 245). By the end of December 
2015, in a show of quick post-floods action, officials from the Corporation of Chennai 
began an eviction drive clearing slums along the Adyar River. Slum dwellers from areas 
such as Thideer Nagar where they have lived for generations found themselves joining 
their counterparts from Pudupet in resettlement sites close to Semmancheri (their 
destination being another low-lying marshland, Ezhil Nagar in Okkiyam Thoraipakkam). 
Barely had they emerged from the month-long misery when the stark reality of floods-as-
disaster compelled them to rethink their everyday relations with hazardscape (cf. Mustafa 
2005) that they were plunged into a nightmare, once again (and a long-lasting one), 
through this relocation.  
 
The troubling aspect here is that such institutional decisions which can only be 
deemed as regressive were not even informed by an expert knowledge but an arbitrary 
decision making process that overrides any form of knowledge system providing a suitably 
different reading of environmental change (especially one that holds the State accountable 
as an environmental subject). Accompanying this is the usual hogwash of heavy-handed 
solutions for controlling flood and other ecological risks. Such responses are reactions to 
the floods as a specific shock rather than considering the challenge of a continuous process 
of water management through a hydrological cycle. Led by middling bureaucrats who take 
little into account of the diversity of people’s ecological framings, hard sciences continue 
to dominate policymaking. Disregarding the historic, generative causes of such risk and the 
myriad subtle connections between humans and nature, this misplaced belief in artifice’s 
ability to tame nature has led to a chronic reliance on flood-control technologies as the 
undisputed answer to tackling such disasters in the future.  
 
In the case of Chennai, one of the major causes of the 2015 floods was the blocking 
of Okkiyam Maduvu, a channel which in the natural scheme of things is crucial to draining 
excess rainwater from the Pallikaranai marsh into the sea. But at 16 Km from the sea, this 
is a slow process of drainage, firstly into the man-made Buckingham Canal which in turn 
discharges into the Kovalam estuary. In 2009, acknowledging the length of time this takes, 
a flood alleviation programme proposed the construction of a short-cut diversion channel 
that would drain rainwater directly from Buckingham Canal to the sea, one that would be 
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faster than the slower system of marshland natural drainage system. Even though the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in its 2014 report reproached the government for 
defective planning of flood control projects in Chennai, it is disheartening to see its 
emphasis on techno-engineering solutions as it endorsed schemes for short, straight canals 
and flood protection walls, sanctioning controversial land acquisition as well as clearing of 
encroachments to meet the alignment criteria of such schemes. Thus, in the aftermath of 
the 2015 floods, the Tamil Nadu State Government Chief Minister Jayalalithaa announced 
that a detailed investigation would be taken to have a regulated canal (straight cut) directly 
to the sea from the Buckingham Canal, adjoining Okkiyam Maduvu. This, she believed, 
would be the best long-term solution for not only ensuring faster discharge of surplus 
water during heavy rainfall but also allow a certain amount of fresh water to remain in the 
wetland. One can only be wary of such solutions especially in light of Das’s (2014) 
scepticism about effective flood control planning which according to him has lost out to 
the political economy of corruption and the inefficiencies intrinsic to a system at the mercy 
of patronage relationships. Such solutions are not even about the challenges of an 
expertise-driven planning prioritising professional knowledges and practices but about the 
blind spot created by a state-driven assumption that risk can be managed with engineering 
solutions. In this collapse of a socionatural understanding of environmental risk, the 
greatest challenge is our failure to acknowledge that ‘a single hazard in a place is the 
outcome of interactions of geographical variables across spatial scales’ (Mustafa 2005: 
566).   
 
Rescaling the ‘urbanisation of disaster’ discourse 
Barely had the city recovered from the 1200 mm of rainfall it had received during the 
month of November (generally considered to be the city’s annual quota) when, between 1 
and 2 December, the city received 345 mm of rain, a much-touted meteorological record 
over a 24-hour period in the month of December (the previous maximum of 261.2 mm was 
114 years ago in 1901). In the following days, Chennai witnessed the worst of the floods, 
one that was exasperated by two factors. Firstly, is the spatial variability of rainfall as more 
rains lashed peripheral areas than the city, wherein against the city’s 35 cm there was 49 
cm of rainfall in Tambaram (southwest in Kanchipuram district), 47 cm in 
Chembarambakkam (west in Kanchipuram district) and Ponneri (north in Thiruvallur 
district) received 39 cm. A Rapid Assessment Report produced by the Indian Institute of 
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Science and Indian Institute of Technology (2016) observed that the 24-hour rainfall in the 
city was more like a 25-year storm (rainfall intensity peaking at 35mm/hr) whereas that 
recorded in Chembarambakkam on the outskirts was more like a 100-year storm (rainfall 
intensity peaking at nearly 60mm/hr). With the natural rainwater drains, run-offs and spill-
overs blocked off by a reckless and unregulated process of periurbanisation, excess water 
quickly breached the shrunken tanks, reservoirs and canals, flooding initially the 
surrounding areas and eventually the city. Second is the controversial decision of the state 
government to release 29000 cusecs of water from Chembarambakkam reservoir. 
According to official reports, on the afternoon of 1 December, as the reservoir was 
reaching its maximum capacity (3645 million cubic feet), the Chennai district collector 
issued a press statement that water will be released from the reservoir at the rate of 5000 
cubic feet per second, possibly increasing the overflow to 7500 cusecs, and advised people 
residing along the banks of the Adyar river to move to safer areas. By the morning of 2 
December, with most areas of Chennai within a radius of 7 km on either side of the Adyar 
river under water, it was clear that this was simply not from heavy rainfall and that more 
than 7500 cusecs had to have been released to unleash this kind of damage.13 That those in-
charge underestimated the implications of the river’s wider geographical basin was 
apparent from this particular disaster.  
 
There are three major rivers flowing through the Chennai Metropolitan Area (CMA), 
Kosasthalaiyar, Cooum and Adyar, each of them being part of a larger, regional watershed 
system, with their own defining characteristics. The CMA covers 1189 km2 over three 
districts (176 km2 of Chennai district, 637 km2 of Thiruvallur district and 376 km2 of 
Kanchipuram district) (Figure 02). The Kosasthalaiyar River originates about 100 km from 
Chennai to the northwest in North Arcot district, with its main branch feeding the Poondi 
Reservoir (the largest in the city), before travelling through Thiruvallur district and CMA, 
finally joining the sea at Ennore Creek. Cooum River is a bifurcation from the main 
Kosasthalaiyar River, flowing mostly through Kanchipuram district before entering the 
city and draining at Napier’s Bridge into the sea. Adyar River has modest beginnings from 
Malaipattu tank near Sriperumbudur in Kanchipuram district, appearing only as a stream 
                                                 
13 I am grateful to Sandhya Ravishankar’s in-depth analysis that appeared in thewire.in on this particular 
aspect of the Chennai floods. Retrieved from http://thewire.in/17468/as-chennai-flooded-officials-fiddled/ 
[Accessed on 28.07.2016] 
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from the point where water from Chembarambakkam tank joins the river. Cooum and 
Adyar constitute two important rivers in the city, marking geographically, during the city’s 
colonial foundations, its northern and southern boundaries. Even though within the CMA 
both the rivers cut across in an easterly direction to a short distance of 24 km, they are very 
different as river basins. Thus, the Cooum River, 72 km in total length, has a macro 
drainage area of 502 km2, carrying surplus from 75 tanks in its catchment area, and a 
bankfull discharge of 991 m3/s. On the other hand, Adyar River is a shorter 42 km, with a 
larger macro drainage area of 720 km2, 450 tanks feeding into it, and a bankfull discharge 
of 2038 m3/s, twice that of Cooum River (Narasimhan et al. 2016). It is therefore not 
surprising that most historic accounts of Chennai’s earlier floods often refer in particular to 
the flooding of Adyar River. In the specific context of December 2015 floods, even though 
the outflow from Chembarambakkam tank itself was only 800 m3/s, overflow from its 
inter-linked system of smaller eris, canals and drains meant that the flood flow of the river 
peaked at 3800 m3/s, exceeding 60,000 cusecs of water (way beyond its capacity of 40,000 
cusecs). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 02 HERE 
Caption: Chennai’s city and metropolitan boundaries with its river systems 
 
The frustrating aspect of this debate around why and should the government have released 
so much water from Chembarambakkam tank with such little notice is that this is not the 
first time surplus water from Chembarambakkam tank has been released under similar 
circumstances exasperating an existing flood-like situation in the city. Earlier in 
November, 18000 cusecs of water had been released with calamitous flooding in the 
nearby neighbourhoods of Mudichur, West Tambaram and Manapakkam. Even though 
some noise had been made over its disastrous consequences, given their peripheral 
location, it didn’t raise as much concern as the one that followed the December deluge. 
While similar amounts of water had been let out from Poondi reservoir into Cooum River, 
with not so much rainfall in its catchment area and its differing nature of flood water 
discharge meant that there was minimal flooding of the Cooum River. But 
Chembarambakkam has its own precedents which was conveniently ignored. On the night 
of 24 November 1976, facing the consequences of a severe cyclonic storm, state officials 
released 28,000 cusecs of water with deadly flooding of settlements and neighbourhoods 
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along the Adyar riverbanks (EPW 1976). This practice continued through almost every 
single major flood episode in the city (1985, 1996, 2005 and 2008). While the government 
was quick to release a press statement defending its decision, it shows the need to 
understand better the hydrological regimes of Chennai’s river systems and its associated 
socio-natural risks. While such disasters echo the futility of command and control schemes 
managed by engineers and flood mitigation experts deferring to the decisions of 
bureaucrats and politicians, there is an urgent need for tackling floods as complex riverine 
phenomenon whose dynamics are framed by a geomorphology of a wider floodplain. This 
is also perhaps one instance where we would be better served looking backwards rather 
than forwards. Thus, alongside a tendency to populate the debate with a spate of mostly 
scientific and quantitative analyses of flooding through georeferencing, hydrological 
modelling, and generating impressive GIS as well as remote sensing maps, what is equally 
required is a critical historiography of how specific watershed areas have been socio-
politically manipulated and transformed.  
 
This is particularly pertinent in the case of Chembarambakkam tank and its 
metamorphosis from an irrigation tank to a standby water supply reservoir for the city. 
Until the 1990s, Chembarambakkam was a historic irrigation tank feeding the paddy fields 
of the surrounding 168 agricultural villages, covering a catchment area of 357 km2 
(Kolappan, 2015). It is crucial to the Adyar river sub-basin controlling nearly 40 per cent 
of its water with the remaining 60 per cent coming from other major and minor tanks 
upstream. Understanding this is crucial as the upper catchment area (including the 
Chembarambakkam tank) occupies 75 per cent of the total area of the Adyar river sub-
basin and has a major say in the way the river floods and thereby affects the city which is 
further downstream (Vidyapriya et al. 2012; Figure 3). In the early 1990s, based on the 
World Bank practice of encouraging inter-sectoral reallocation of irrigation water using 
precedents of buying out farmers’ rights to irrigation tanks (especially in peri-urban 
contexts), the state government of Tamil Nadu sanctioned the reallocation of the tank from 
irrigation to general purposes (in this context, specifically for Chennai’s drinking water 
supply). Since 2000, the tank has been used to convey water to Porur Lake as well as a 
reservoir for the diverted water from Krishna Water Supply Project, alongside the 
construction of a 540mld water treatment plant on site. We cannot pick too many bones 
here over its transformation as Swyngedouw (2009) reminds us that hydraulic 
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environments are in essence socio-physical constructions that are actively and historically 
produced and thus there is nothing apriori unnatural about reconstructing them as large-
scale water infrastructure projects. However, what is worrying is the resulting 
environmental change where, over the past two decades, an intricate system of established 
agricultural canals that used to lead out of the tank has disappeared. This can be mainly 
attributed to the specific pattern of periurbanisation following the re-designation of the 
nearby town of Sriperumbudur as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and its related 
development as an industrial corridor attracting global automotive and telecommunication 
industries. Referred to as India’s “new Shenzhen” (Homm and Bohle 2012), the area has 
witnessed a rapid depletion of its sensitive natural habitat, privileging the growth of 
factories over flora and fauna. It is not surprising that most of these plants (including 
Hyundai, Renault-Nissan, Daimler, Ford, etc.) quickly submerged in water suspending 
their operations for several days.  Also, by dumbing the tank down from its complex 
function as an irrigation reservoir to a surface-water conservation reservoir, state 
bureaucrats and technocrats did not address all factors such as shift entails. Thus, every 
time the state has tried using Chembarambakkam as a flood-control reservoir, it has failed 
miserably. As one of the largest tanks in the CMA, its design was meant for irrigation 
purposes, with an exit as high as possible to irrigate maximum land. But for urban water 
supply and flood management the exit needs to be low with overflow across minimum 
surface area. In re-imaginging the tank from a surplus to a scarcity reservoir, state 
authorities have tampered with its socio-hydrological function, irreparably changing its 
relationship with its wider landscape without rectifying its original physiography.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Caption: Chennai Metropolitan Area in the context of Chennai River Basin and 
Adyar Sub-River Basin 
 
This pushes us to question once again the prevalent emphasis on expertise, 
questioning the social figure of the expert and its epistemic consequences (Boyer 2008). 
Often based on a flawed logic, their decisions have continually made the city more 
vulnerable. What is also annoying is the way they invoke inevitability as an inchoate 
reasoning, in this case, letting the water out being inevitable, reminding us of Kelman’s 
(2006) argument that assuming inevitability is less elegant and more damaging as it leaves 
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no room for contingency. Following stringent criticism of the government’s decision to 
release water from Chembarambakkam tank, the Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Tamil Nadu issued a press note on 13 December emphasising that they followed the Rules 
for Flood Regulation as stipulated in the Compendium of Rules of Regulation of the Public 
Works Department which requires the State to ‘balance the interests of water storage for 
the scarcity period, the need to control flooding in downstream areas and the safety of the 
reservoir’ (emphasis original).14 But as already noted, achieving this balance is impossible 
given the contradictory operational mechanisms embedded in the function of a water 
storage versus a flood control reservoir. Denying the interference of bureaucrats and 
politicians, the press statement emphasised the ‘engineer’ as the competent authority, 
reinforcing their role in the technical management of urban space within regional industrial 
systems (Gandy 1997). Disregarding the possibility of following meteorological 
predictions to make decisions well ahead in time, there was once again a statistical 
simplification of the de facto pattern of rainfall, where much of the explanation suggests a 
tendency to mistake correlation for causation, imprisoning the discourse of floods within a 
narrow ecological imagination.  
 
The December floods indicate even more the need to consider the aggregate of 
extreme events over an expanded sense of the region. There is an unevenness to 
urbanisation with substantial local variations, which combined with an increasingly 
heterogeneous rainfall spread requires us to widen the scope of a hydro-meteorological 
region for any kind of useful analysis. Thus, a simple ‘urbanisation of disaster’ argument 
pointing out to disaster risk as a manifestation of urban growth and its depleting effects on 
ecosystems is insufficient. Rescaling our dissection of Chennai floods as a periurbanisation 
and regionalisation of disaster shows that neither is the ecosystem secure at this scale nor 
can we assume that looking at the watershed or river basin will promote a better holistic 
understanding of human-environment relations. Nevertheless, rethinking the socionatural 
risks of floods in the twenty-first century is better served by rescaling its ramifications 
beyond a city or even metropolitan demarcations (defined arbitrarily by the convenience of 
governance structures) and redrawing ecosystem boundaries to a biophysically determined 
region. In this context, the December floods forces us also to address the fact that what we 
                                                 
14 Press Note NO: 188 released on 13 December, 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.tn.gov.in/pressrelease/archives [Accessed 26.07.2016] 
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are dealing with here is not a plain hydrological cycle but a more complex hybridized form 
of socio-natural flow, one that is nested within an unstable scalar configuration that is 
perpetually constructed and reconstructed (Swyngedouw 2004).  
 
Final remarks: The futility of resilience 
The irony here is that only a year earlier, in December 2014, Chennai was amongst three 
Indian cities (including Surat and Bangalore) selected to the proud roster of 35 cities 
joining the 100 Resilient Cities programme set up by the Rockefeller Foundation (with a 
funding of $100 million), a pioneering initiative to help cities around the world become 
more resilient to the physical, social and economic challenges of the twenty-first century. 
According to a statement released by the network, Chennai was chosen based on a 
coordinated disaster response plan developed in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. In addition, it appreciated the city for making efforts to build on experience, 
learning from past events and continuing to provide best-practice solutions to other 
regions. And yet, as this paper establishes, this is pure drivel given the way the city has 
treated every disaster as ‘unprecedented’ and there is little jurisprudence to the way 
policies are proposed in their aftermath. One of the first steps emerging from the 100 
Resilient Cities Programme was the purported appointment of a Chief Resilience Office 
for the city, a position that remains unfilled even in the wake of the December floods.  
There has however been no end to numerous workshops conducted and reports produced 
since the beginning of 2016. While some are useful, most simply perpetuate the tripe that 
dominates these conversations. Typically, they bring together a diverse range of 
international and local experts to identify best practices and tangible ideas that could help 
Chennai become more flood-resistant in the future. Recommendations generally include 
mega-engineering solutions such as redirecting the flows of rivers (actions that were 
responsible for the floods in the first place), and construction of artificial channels and 
outlets, all offered by a multitude of global consultancies seeking lucrative contracts. Even 
though some caution against overreliance on technical responses, most wilfully ignore the 
critical issue of disappearing wetlands, flood plains and waterbodies. It makes us question 
the usefulness of a resilience discourse, especially one that unquestioningly transmits 
scientific information from a known, intentional source (the experts) to a passive set of 
willing recipients, i.e., the state authorities and the public. The problem here is that such 
expertise is underwritten by professional and institutional knowledges and practices 
ARABINDOO: CHENNAI FLOODS 
 
 
CITY JOURNAL 26 31/01/2017 
(mostly from the outside), prioritising tangible and visible solutions. There is also a sense 
of pointlessness to such deliberations as they merely join a long line of schemes that have 
been enthusiastically proposed but rarely implemented. Over the years, state officials have 
announced any number of flood protection strategies, both structural and non-structural, 
but as a CAG audit for 2013 and 2014 found most of these suffer from an endless spiral of 
delayed decision making and increasing costs.  
 
The other vexing issue with resilience is its promulgation of a culture of optimism 
where cities always bounce back as they are rebuilt all the time. Taking for granted their 
durability, the premise of post-disaster urbanism is that modern cities almost always 
recover from disaster. It detracts us from addressing its conflict-ridden nature as well as 
questions about equity. This is flagged by Vale and Campanella (2005) who find that 
resilience as a function of political power is perhaps nothing more than a rhetorical device. 
Cultivating a prematurely progressive narrative, its manipulation by capital makes it 
inherently controversial. It is thus difficult to share the enthusiasm of the CITY Journal 
debate where Taylor and Schafran (2015) maintain that resilience can be redeemed if it 
critically engages with the everyday and actually existing politics and processes, and that it 
can be a means of both imagining and building better urban futures. If one goes by the 
simple definition of resilience as the ability to bounce back, then yes, Chennai has 
demonstrated remarkable resilience in the aftermath of the devastating floods. Within a 
few weeks, scant traces of disaster remained (mostly seen in garbage pile ups and 
abandoned cars), as the city seemed to recoup its losses as quickly as possible. But to seek 
comfort in such a capability engenders a false sense of confidence, till the next disaster 
strikes. The concern about employing a resilience discourse here is not even in terms of it 
possibly being a neoliberal connotation (cf. Zeiderman 2016), but at a simpler level. By 
focussing on resilience, city governance officials do not bother to fix the problems at hand, 
or if they do, it is done shoddily, only making the problems worse, as seen in state 
responses to averting a flood-like situation again in the future. In this case, risk signifies a 
condition where human and nonhuman threats are constantly looming, thus becoming the 
new parable to justify brutal political actions such as evicting slum dwellers from the 
riverbanks barely a few weeks after the floods. The immediacy of the disaster allows a 
constitutive relationship between politics and risk, invoking key framings of the resilience 
discourse including vulnerability, mitigation, threat, etc. to set aside rights and entitlements 
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arguments of the urban poor and justify their resettlement. Arguments such as right to the 
city as invoked by the urban poor in their struggles to assert some semblance of citizenship 
is disenabled by the idiom of resilience.  
 
It is not just the poor who have had to bear the brunt but also civil society activists 
whose efforts at highlighting the environmental risks posed by capitalist modes of 
urbanisation, and calling for immediate as well as long-term remedial action have been 
neatly sidestepped by the state, dismissing their hard facts as their usual rant. With no 
possibility of a state-civil society alliance in the future, at least as far as environmental 
actions are concerned, in the post-floods scenario, we are left with an environmental 
subjectivity that shows little promise of being socio-ecologically progressive. This 
pessimism is seen in Catterall’s (2016: 2-8) reflection that the breakdown that ensued was  
on the one hand, an example of the fragility of our technological condition, an intricate 
array of communication systems and work patterns, at a time of increasing globalisation 
and acute climate change, but also, on the other, of the fragility of our knowledge and 
understanding of our condition, and underlying this despite easy talk…about 
contestation, of reform versus revolution (now safely evaded through resilience?) the 
creation/destruction opposition (now safely amalgated?), of “urban” versus the rural and 
“the city”, of commodities and coomodification, paradigms and 
epistemologies….These are insecure foundations 
 
His biggest concern is however 
An approach to urbanisation that marginalizes the earthy riverrun planet, the 
commodification of knowledge that supports such marginalisation, such are the insecure 
foundations that sanitised new epistemologies hide and that a genuine paradigm shift 
needs to secure.  
  
As the disaster hangover slowly fades away, and we forget the complexity of factors 
comprising the root cause, the paradigm shift that Catterall (ibid.) calls for seems far away 
given the continued preference of the state and its allied actors for the legitimacy of 
probability and statistically driven inputs. Thus, when the Chief Secretary to the 
Government of Tamil Nadu insists that the floods were a ‘rarest of rare natural calamity’ 
and that the flooding was caused primarily due to very heavy rainfall, it makes us wonder 
if we are being naïve in suggesting the possibility of an alternative culture of knowledge, 
and believing that it will provide ammunition for a more critical approach in the future.  
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